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Abstract
We arrive at new conclusions for social choice theory by considering the process in
which we refine decision–theoretic models and account for previously irrelevant parame-
ters of a decision situation (cf. Savage’s ‘small worlds’). Suppose that, for each individual,
we consider a coarse–grained and a fine–grained decision–theoretic model, both of which
are consistent with each other in a sense to be defined. We desire any social choice rule
to be stable under refinements in the sense that the group choice based on fine–grained
individual models and the group choice based on coarse–grained individual models agree
for choices among coarse–grained alternatives. For ex ante aggregation, we find that
stability is ubiquitous since it follows from independence of irrelevant alternatives. In
ex post aggregation, individuals’ utilities are pooled separately from their beliefs before
the group’s choice function is constructed. We find that any ‘non–exceptional’ rule (e.g.,
any Pareto optimal rule) for ex post aggregation must be unstable. If the rule is, in
addition, independent of irrelevant alternatives, we find an infinite series of reversals of
binary group choices. We consider applications to risk management and the theory of
consensus formation.
JEL classification numbers: D63, D71, D81
Key words: consensus formation, ex ante aggregation, ex post aggregation, independence
of irrelevant alternatives, refinements, risk management, small worlds, social choice the-
ory
Stable Aggregation of Preferences
Matthias Hild∗
1 Introduction and Motivation
Stability under refinements
When decision theorists specify a model to describe an individual’s preferences in a
particular decision situation, they are faced with an infinity of potentially relevant details,
or parameters. Fortunately, most of these details do not matter for decision situations in
the real world. Nonetheless, the particular set of relevant details varies across different
decision situations. Parameters that were irrelevant for some choices may well become
relevant for other choices. It is therefore vital to consider the process of refining a given
decision–theoretic model by taking previously neglected parameters into account. The
locus classicus for such considerations is Savage (1954). In the present paper, we shall
consider refinements of individual decision–theoretic models in the context of social choice
theory. We will produce a new argument for adopting the condition of independence of
irrelevant alternatives for ex ante social choice rules. Moreover, we state a new and
general impossibility result for the ex post aggregation.
For a brief sketch of our framework, we restrict ourselves to individuals who maximize
expected utility. Later we will see that the majority of all presently available decision
theories is covered by our general result. For each individual 1, . . . , I, let Mi = 〈Pi, ui〉
be a decision–theoretic model, where Pi is i’s subjective probability measure and ui is i’s
subjective utility function. A decision–theoretic model M ′ is more detailed than model
M iff, firstly, M ′ can describe all consequences of M and, secondly, M ′ individuates
consequences between which the coarser model M is unable to discriminate. As an
example, think of the coarsely described consequence of a rise in the Euro/USD exchange
rate and the more finely described consequences of a rise of at least 10% and a rise of
less than 10%. We view the factorization of the individuals’ evaluations of uncertain
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prospects into beliefs and utilities as an iterative, fractal–like process. What is a utility
on one level of analysis is a compound of beliefs and utilities on another level of analysis.
We say that M ′ refines M exactly if M ′ is more detailed than M and the probabilities and
expected utilities in M ′ are consistent with those in M . We will argue that social choice
rules should be stable under decision–theoretic refinements in the following sense: If the
individual models M ′1, . . . ,M
′
I refine M1, . . . ,MI respectively, then the group’s resulting
choice functions C ′ and C should be consistent with each other.
We consider two alternative modes of aggregating individual models into group choice.
The first, ex ante mode aggregates the individuals’ expected utilities. We adapt the
notion of independence of irrelevant alternatives to our framework that allows variable
sets of possible, distinguishable options. We then find that independence of irrelevant
alternatives implies stability under refinements. The converse is true under a closure
condition on the domain of the social choice rule. This first result provides new support
for adopting independence of irrelevant alternatives as a desired property of ex ante
social choice rules. The second, ex post mode splits individual expected utilities into
probabilities and utilities before aggregation takes place (cf. Hammond, 1981). We find
that any ‘non–exceptional’ rule (e.g., any Pareto optimal rule) for ex post aggregation
must be unstable. If the rule is, in addition, independent of irrelevant alternatives, we
find an infinite series of reversals of binary group choices.
Hence, we cannot be sure that instabilities will not eventually disappear as we continue
to refine the individuals’ decision–theoretic models. Hild (2001b) provides correspond-
ing impossibility results for a hybrid form of aggregation that Levi (1990) calls ‘robust
aggregation’.1 We follow Savage (1954) and represent acts as functions from states to
consequences.2 Our results make few presuppositions about the decision theory used to
describe individual preferences. As far as the group is concerned, we make no assump-
tions about the existence of group beliefs or group preferences. We merely assume that an
ex post social choice rule aggregates the individuals’ utilities and that, in binary choices,
it chooses absolutely dominant acts in a sense that is weaker than the sure–thing prin-
ciple or related dominance conditions. These meek assumptions reassure us that group
choice reversals are not the artifact of a particular decision theory or a narrow class of
aggregation rules but a troubling feature of the ex post mode itself.
Risk management
The burgeoning discipline of risk management provides a concrete example of an ex
post social choice rule (cf. Glickman/Gough, 1990). The decision–theoretic approach
1Levi proposed robust aggregation in reaction to Seidenfeld’s version of the Ex Ante Homogeneity
Theorem (cf. below). Robust aggregation forms hypothetical individuals Mij := 〈Pi, uj〉 (1 ≤ i, j ≤ I)
and proceeds by ex ante aggregation of these hypothetical individuals.
2Our technical report Hild (2001c) discusses modifications of our definitions and theorem in a frame-
work that does not presuppose the separation of states and consequences and which contains no explicit
representation of the underlying (causal) structure of acts. This framework allows us to simplify our
notation and proofs in return for some stronger postulates.
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to risk management structures the process of social decision making into two carefully
separated parts and then uses concepts from decision analysis to arrive at a policy rec-
ommendation. In the first part, the highly professionalized discipline of probabilistic risk
assessment procures probabilities for social decision making (Henley/Kumamoto, 1992).
In the second part, a social utility function is constructed. In applications such as health
care economics or environmental cost–benefit analysis, a social utility is obtained on the
basis of individuals’ subjective utilities for the outcomes of a risky policy measure. In
these applications, social utility is typically defined as the average of the individuals’
utilities (Haddix et al., 1996). Decision–theoretic risk management then proceeds by
maximizing the expected social utility relative to the estimated probabilities. In the
applications mentioned, the structure of the risk management process fits our definition
of an ex post social choice rule. Since we make no assumptions about the existence of
group probabilities or the manner in which they are constructed, our results apply even
when individuals’ probabilities are replaced by some expert’s risk assessment.
The motivation for a factorization of ex ante evaluations into probabilities and utili-
ties is fundamentally a philosophical one. According to a common normative argument,
risk managers ought to separate questions of fact (probabilities) and questions of value
(utilities). Implicit is the view that beliefs enjoy a special status vis-a-vis values that
allows us to apply the norms of rational discourse and of scientific method to disagreeing
beliefs. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1975) was the first to put this convic-
tion into practice, thereby creating the discipline of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).
Disagreements about the social value of possible consequences, on the other hand, are
settled by aggregating individuals’ subjective values (at least in the applications that we
mentioned).
For this reason, the current practice of risk management is closely bound to the
ex post mode of aggregation and is, thus, liable to produce unstable social choices.
Pursuing an empirical line of reasoning, we may conclude that the choice of different levels
of detail may crucially influence the risk managers’ decision. In its current structure,
the risk management process therefore bestows potentially significant political power
on whoever controls the choice of the degree of detail with which a risk management
study is conducted. Pursuing a normative line of reasoning, we argue that the current
practice of risk management is deficient. Our positive result that stability is ubiquitous
among ex ante social choice rules suggests a concrete and practical alternative to the
current decision–theoretic approach to risk management. Briefly, our solution retains
PRA’s maxim to be rational about probabilities but abandons the maxim that ex ante
evaluations should be factorized into beliefs and values. The result is a two–stage process
in which individuals first update their ex ante evaluations with the results of PRA and
in which we then aggregate the individuals’ ex ante evaluations by some ex ante social
choice rule, such as voting or auctioning. This approach brings the large literature on
the implementation of ex ante social choice rules to bear on risk management decisions
(cf. Hild (2001d) for a more extensive discussion and organizational conclusions).
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The possibility of consensus
Stability comes close to a conditio sine qua non for any self–contained and complete
theory of consensus. If a rule for consensus formation depends on the choice of a level of
detail, this choice will itself become the topic of disagreement among individuals. Any
complete theory of consensus must therefore be either stable under refinements or explic-
itly determine a relevant level of detail for any given decision situation. If we do not share
the hope that we can produce a theory that explicitly determines a relevant level of detail,
it becomes interesting to consider our instability theorem in the context of recent work
on ex ante aggregation of Bayesian preferences. Assuming that individuals and the group
are expected utility maximizers, Goodman (1988), Seidenfeld/Kadane/Schervish (1989),
Broome (1990), Schervish/Seidenfeld/Kadane (1991), and Mongin (1995, 1998) show in
various decision–theoretic frameworks and in various degrees of generality that Pareto
optimal ex ante aggregation already presupposes a disturbingly high degree of homogene-
ity of either individual probabilities or utilities. In the case of two individuals (I = 2), a
high degree of homogeneity means that either the individuals’ probabilities are identical
or their utilities are identical up to affine transformations.3
Ex Ante Homogeneity Theorem (Mongin, 1995). Assume that individuals
and group maximize expected utility. Let M1, . . . ,MI the individuals’ decision–theoretic
models and M0 the group’s decision–theoretic model such that ex ante Pareto optimality
and a non–triviality condition are satisfied.4 Then either p1, . . . , pI are linearly dependent
or u1, . . . , uI are affinely dependent.
In reaction to this impossibility theorem, it might at first seem tempting to abandon
the ex ante mode and to shift either to the ex post mode or, as Levi (1990) advocates,
to the robust mode. The reasons for suggesting a shift to the ex post mode could be
as follows: The proof of the Ex Ante Homogeneity Theorem relies on the phenomenon
of individuals who have identical preferences for ‘different reasons’. More precisely, the
identity of two individuals’ expected utilities does not imply the identity of either their
probabilities or their utilities. One individual might judge a certain consequence of an
act unlikely but highly desirable, another might judge the consequence more likely but
less desirable, and yet both may agree on their overall evaluation of the act. Since this
phenomenon leads to the Ex Ante Homogeneity Theorem, it may seem opportune not
to aggregate on the level of preferences but to proceed in the ex post mode on a deeper
3As the number I of individuals increases beyond 2, this conclusion becomes less severe because
the probabilities and utilities of I > 2 individuals can be linearly or affinely dependent while not being
identical. Note, however, that linear/affine independence of individual probabilities/utilities is a sufficient
but not a necessary condition for the impossibility of Pareto optimal aggregation into Bayesian group
preferences. Using the proof strategy of Seidenfeld/Kadane/Schervish (1989), Goodman (1988) discusses
a case involving N = 3 individuals with linearly/affinely dependent probabilities/utilities and provides
a necessary and sufficient condition for the impossibility of Pareto optimal Bayesian aggregation in this
case.
4The required Pareto condition is: If f i g for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I but f j g for some 1 ≤ j ≤ I, then
f 0 g. The non–triviality condition is: There are consequences c, c′ such that ui(c) > ui(c′) for all
0 ≤ i ≤ I.
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level where we can account for the individuals’ ‘reasons’ for their preferences, namely
their probabilities and utilities (cf. Mongin, 1998). Our instability theorem frustrates
this proposal. Instabilities theorem arise, ironically, from the very same phenomenon
of ‘agreement for different reasons’ that we have already identified as the source of the
Ex Ante Homogeneity Theorem. Incidentally, Hylland/Zeckhauser (1979) also draw on
‘agreement for different reasons’ when they show that ex post aggregation may violate ex
ante Pareto optimality. The importance of Hylland and Zeckhauser’s result is, however,
limited since there is no reason why we should continue to require ex ante Pareto opti-
mality once we adopt the ex post mode of aggregation. In short, the combination of the
Ex Ante Homogeneity Theorem and our instability theorem presents us with yet another
difficulty in social choice theory: On the one hand, ex ante aggregation is troubled by
the Ex Ante Homogeneity Theorem. On the other hand, ex ante aggregation seems to
be the only available way of satisfying stability under refinements.
What is to be done? I cannot address this question in the present paper, but I am
inclined to reconsider the current paradigm of social choice theory. I submit that this
paradigm suffers from a lack of concern for the dynamic aspects of group formation.
This trend started with Arrow’s individualistic outlook under the guise of liberalism.
Arrow (1951) writes: “[...] we will [...] also assume in the present study that individual
values are taken as data and are not capable of being altered by the nature of the decision
process itself. This, of course, is the standard view in economic theory [...] and also in the
classical liberal creed” (p.7s). An alternative view stresses the dynamic aspects of group
formation. On this view, being a member of a group and participating in social choice has
itself an impact on the formation of individual preferences. We will study this feedback of
aggregation processes onto individual preferences elsewhere. Perhaps we should interpret
the troublesome ex ante Pareto condition as a solution concept for the aggregation process
rather than a procedural condition. We would then say that an (ideal) group has been
formed exactly when Pareto optimal ex ante aggregation has become possible. Since ex
ante Pareto optimality implies a high degree of homogeneity, the successful completion
of the dynamic aggregation process could, therefore, be characterized by a high degree
of homogeneity.
2 Ex Ante Aggregation
Refinements
Let Γ be a non–empty set which we will call a frame of reference for consequences. Let
Φ be a non–empty set which we will call a frame of reference for acts. It is relative to
such frames of reference that we will compare the degrees of detail with which different
decision–theoretic models describe the same decision situation. A frame of reference can
be chosen arbitrarily as long as it is fine–grained enough to capture all the parameters of
the most detailed model that we wish to consider. As far as consequences are concerned,
we represent a model’s degree of detail by some partition C of Γ, our frame of reference
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for consequences. The elements of this partition take the place of consequences in a
conventional framework. We will eventually also replace the worlds of a conventional
model with the elements of a partitionW (Savage’s ‘small worlds’) and explicitly consider
the underlying structure of acts. Partitions of worlds will take centrestage in the following
section. For now, we keep them backstage and assume that acts induce probabilities (or
some other belief measure) for consequences given some suitably defined partition of
worlds.
Illustration: Adapting Savage’s (1954) example, let the frame of reference consist of
the points in the real plane, i.e. pairs 〈x, y〉 of real numbers. The most fine–grained
model relative to this frame of reference represents consequences as points in the real
plane. A coarser model may ignore the second parameter y and represent consequences
as lines in the real plane parallel to the y–axis.
Illustration: Consider the decision problem of a group of directors who consider build-
ing a production plant in Europe. We start with a model that accounts only for the
individuals’ preferences for building or not building the production plant. A second more
detailed model accounts, in addition, for the individuals’ beliefs and utilities concerning
an upward or downward change in the Euro/USD exchange rate. The second model
thus distinguishes the outcome of owning a production plant in Europe in a climate of
an increasing exchange rate and the outcome of owning a production plant in Europe
in a climate of a non–increasing exchange rate. A third yet more detailed model may
account for the individuals’ preferences over additional features, such as the magnitude
of changes in the exchange rate or the future of the European stock market index.
Since we evaluate actions by their potential consequences, the degree of detail with
which we describe consequence also affects how we individuate actions. Choosing, for ex-
ample, a coarse–grained consequence C with certainty amounts to an uncertain prospects
of more fine–grained descriptions of C. More generally, an action induces a certain
prospect of coarse–grained consequences and another prospect of fine–grained conse-
quences.
Illustration: We return to our managerial decision problem. In the first model, the
agents can choose (at least) between building and not building the production plant.
From the viewpoint of the second model, building the production plant amounts to
choosing an uncertain prospect depending on the rise or fall of the exchange rate. In
addition to the actions available in the first model, the second model allows the agent to
make choices that were not available in the first model. For instance, the second model
allows the agent to choose a hedging strategy for the risk of a rising exchange rate. In a
more detailed model, the number of possible acts therefore increases.
In the next section, we will discuss the representation of acts as functions from states
to consequences and formulate the requirements under which a prospect of coarse–grained
consequences and a prospect of fine–grained consequences is induced by the same action.
For now, we only use the fact that the more fine–grained a model becomes, the more
acts it can distinguish. M = 〈F , R〉 is a preference model if and only if F ⊆ Φ and R is
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a relation on F (i.e., R ⊆ F × F). Any F ⊆ Φ is called a set of possible distinguishable
acts. In this simple framework, the set F represents the degree of detail with which the
model describes the decision situation at hand. The set F corresponds to Arrow’s (1951)
set of ‘possible alternatives’. While Arrow kept this set fixed, we will study the behaviour
of social choice rules under variations of the set of possible distinguishable acts F (cf.
Laslier (2000) for a related approach). A preference model M ′ = 〈F ′, R′〉 is more detailed
than a preference model M = 〈F , R〉 exactly when F ⊆ F ′. For any binary relation R
on F and any X ⊆ F , let R|X := R ∩ (X × X) be the restriction of R to X. For any
preference models M = 〈F , R〉 and M ′ = 〈F ′, R′〉, we say that M ′ refines M if and only
if (i) F ⊆ F ′ and (ii) R = R′|F .
For any F ⊆ Φ, we call V a (binary) evaluation function on F if and only if there
is some non–empty set Z such that V : F × F → Z. Commonly, we choose Z =
R. We choose to work with the concept of binary evaluation functions because of its
generality. Loomes/Sugden’s (1982) regret theory provides an example of a genuinely
binary evaluation function in which a preference f  g is defined by V (f, g) > V (g, f).
Moreover, any binary relation R on F can be represented by a binary decision rule
VR defined as the characteristic function of R (i.e., VR : F2 → {0, 1} is defined by
VR(f, g) := 1 if 〈f, g〉 ∈ R and VR(f, g) := 0 else). Finally, binary evaluation functions
allow monadic evaluations as a special case. An evaluation function V on F is monadic if
and only if V (f, g) = V (f, f) for all f, g ∈ F . For a monadic evaluation function V on F ,
we define V (f) := V (f, f) (for all f ∈ F). Expected utility maximization is an example
of a monadic decision rule in which a preference f  g may be defined by V (f) > V (g)
or by V (f) − V (g) > α for some threshold α ∈ R+ (cf. Fishburn, 1988). M = 〈F , V 〉
is an evaluation model if and only if F ⊆ Φ and V is an evaluation function on F . We
define FM and VM as the entities such that M = 〈FM , VM〉. For any evaluation function
V : F → Z and any X ⊆ F , let V |X := V ∩ (X ×X × Z) be the restriction of R to X.
For arbitrary evaluation models M = 〈F , V 〉 and M ′ = 〈F ′, V ′〉, we say that M ′ refines
M if and only if (i) F ⊆ F ′ and (ii) V = V ′|F .
Recall that Arrow (1951) held the set F of possible distinguishable acts fixed, while
we are concerned with variations of this set. In our framework, a set X ⊆ F is a choice
set for F and corresponds to what Arrow (1951) calls an ‘environment’. For any F ⊆ Φ,
C is a choice function for F if and only if C : (2F −{∅})→ (2F −{∅}) and C(X) ⊆ X
for any X ⊆ F . M = 〈F , C〉 is a choice model if and only if F ⊆ Φ and C is a choice
function on F . We define FM and CM as the entities such that M = 〈FM , CM〉. For
arbitrary choice models M = 〈F , C〉 and M ′ = 〈F ′, C ′〉, we say that M ′ refines M if and
only if (i) F ⊆ F ′ and (ii) C(X) = C ′(X) for all X ⊆ F .
Stability
Let I ≥ 2 (I ∈ N) be a fixed number of individuals. Let V be the set of all evaluation
models. Let V(I) be the set of all vectors 〈Fi, Vi〉 of evaluation models with Fi = Fj
(1 ≤ i, j ≤ I). For 〈Mi〉 ∈ R(I) or 〈Mi〉 ∈ V(I), let F〈Mi〉 := FM1 . Let C be the set of all
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choice models. A social choice rule yields a choice function for the group as a function
of individual evaluation models. Avoiding the assumption of an unrestricted domain, we
say that S is an ex ante social choice rule if and only if there is some non–empty set
V ⊆ V(I) such that S : V → C and FS(〈Mi〉) = F〈Mi〉 for any 〈Mi〉 ∈ V . As special
cases, we mention rules that yield a social choice function for any vector of individual
preference orderings (cf. Arrow, 1951) and rules that yield a social choice function for any
vector of individual monadic evaluations (cf. Sen, 1970). We now introduce the central
notion of stability for social choice rules. Stability under refinements guarantees that
social preferences based on refined individual models are compatible with coarser social
preferences based on coarser individual models. We say that the vector 〈M ′i〉 refines the
vector 〈Mi〉 if and only if M ′i refines Mi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I.
Definition 2.1 A social choice rule S is stable under refinements if and only if, for all
〈Mi〉, 〈M ′i〉 in the domain of S, S(〈M ′i〉) refines S(〈Mi〉) whenever 〈M ′i〉 refines 〈Mi〉.
Illustration 1: Stability is the property that makes opinion polls useful and feasible.
If we use a stable social choice rule, opinion polls only need to elicit relatively coarse
preferences about the options at stake. It then becomes unnecessary — as it is in practice
impossible — to include all conceivable details in a poll’s questionnaire.
Illustration 2: A CEO (taking the place of the group) commissions expert reports
(taking the place of individuals). What information may a secretary neglect when sum-
marizing the reports without manipulating the CEO’s decision? What degree of detail in
the expert reports is relevant? If the CEO’s aggregation rule is stable, the secretary may
choose any level of detail on which to summarize the expert reports. If, however, the
CEO’s aggregation rule is not stable, it becomes crucial for the outcome of his decision
which details the secretary’s summary includes.
Illustration 3: A government commissions a risk management study that is divided
into a probabilistic risk assessment and an estimation of the effect of policy outcomes on
the average citizen’s welfare (cf. Section 1).
Is stability a desirable and important property of social choice rules? We offer four
reasons for an affirmative answer. These reasons concern the existence of a buffering
partition, i.e., a partition of consequences in whose refinements no changes in the group’s
preferences occur. First, metaphysical, reason: There is no reason to believe that an
ultimate, maximally fine–grained, partition of reality exists. There is furthermore no
reason to believe that a buffering partition exists. Second, epistemic, reason: Even
if a buffering partition existed, we could never know when it has been reached. Third,
pragmatic, reason: Even if we knew how to construct a buffering partition, the complexity
of this partition would exceed our computational and other capacities. Fourth, political
reason: Since the choice of the partition to be used in the analysis can significantly
influence the recommendation of an unstable social choice rule, there is room for political
manipulation through a clever choice of a favourable partition. This problem is mitigated
only by the difficulty to foresee what level of detail will yield which social choice. Among
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the first three reasons, the pragmatic reason makes the least contentious philosophical
assumption. Yet we believe that it is strong enough to motivate the desire for stability
in view of our illustrations.
Isaac Levi (in private correspondence) suggests that the choice of an appropriate
partition could be an ethico–political judgement and, therefore, an additional parameter
in the modelling of a social decision problem. We would then add a new factor to the
framework of social choice theory, namely the partition that is judged to be relevant.
Our illustrations sketch scenarios in which it would be desirable to avoid ethico–political
judgments of relevance all together. On the one hand, the addition of this new factor
would subvert the initial project of a theory of consensus formation among disagreeing
individuals since the choice of a graining would itself become a topic of disagreement.
On the other hand, it is not clear how an explicit theory of social welfare could decide
which details are relevant for determining the optimal social welfare and thus, implicitly,
the appropriate tradeoffs between different individuals’ welfare. The appeal of stability
derives from the difficulty of choosing a reference partition. It is as coherent to choose
the coarsest partition that allows to distinguish all feasible acts as it is to choose the
most fine–grained partition available. No choice of a reference partition can claim to be
self–evident.5
Independence of irrelevant alternatives
Arrow’s (1951) formulation of independence of irrelevant alternatives keeps the set F of
possible distinguishable actions fixed and does not make it explicit in the notation. Since
we are concerned with changes in the set F , we formulate a version of the independence
condition with explicit reference to the set F . Arrow’s condition requires that, for fixed
F , social choice among the acts in a choice set X ⊆ F , must not depend on individual
preferences for acts outside of X.6 Allowing F to vary, we require, in addition, that
social choice must not depend on the choice of the set F of distinguishable possible acts.
An ex ante social choice rule S : V → C is independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
if and only if, for all 〈F , Vi〉, 〈F ′, V ′i 〉 ∈ V and all X ⊆ F ∩ F ′, if Vi|X = V ′i |X for all
1 ≤ i ≤ I, then CS(〈Mi〉)(X) = CS(〈M ′i〉)(X). Clearly, we obtain Arrow’s version of the
condition if we keep F fixed. Note that we do not presuppose the existence of a group
preference or any rationality axioms like the weak axiom of revealed preference theory.
As Plott (1976) emphasizes, IIA for choice functions is an extremely weak condition that
is satisfied by any implementable social choice rules, including the following examples:
5Levi (in private correspondence) suggests to define the relevant level of detail as the coarsest common
refinement of the individuals’ ‘basic partitions’ (cf. Levi, 1986). Even if we agreed (which we do not)
that there were some privileged ‘basic partition’ for each individual, the choice of the coarsest common
refinement is itself a value judgement far from self–evident. Moreover, the individuals may have reasons,
including economic incentives, to disagree with this value judgement.
6In the more general terms of evaluation functions, Arrow’s condition requires that, for any evaluation
functions Vi, V ′i on F (1 ≤ i ≤ I) and any X ⊆ F , if Vi|X = V ′i |X for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, then CS(〈Vi〉)(X) =
CS(〈V ′i 〉)(X).
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• utilitarian rules with weights λi that do not depend on F
• allocative leximin and leximax
• de Borda count
• Nash equilibrium
• auctioning
We now formulate a closure condition on the domain of social choice rules. It requires
that if a social choice rule can be applied to some vector 〈Mi〉 of individual models,
then it can also be applied to the restrictions of these models to any set of actions
X ⊆ F〈Mi〉. Formally, any set V ⊆ V(I) is closed under restrictions if and only if, for
any 〈F , Vi〉 ∈ V and any X ∈ F , we also have 〈X,Vi|X〉 ∈ V . This condition is trivially
satisfied by social choice rules with an unrestricted domain. An easy theorem now records
the close connection between stability under refinements and the more familiar condition
of independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Theorem 2.2 (1) If an ex ante social choice rule is IIA, then it is also stable under
refinements.
(2) If an ex ante social choice rule is stable under refinements and its domain is closed
under restrictions, then it is also IIA.
All proofs are collected in the appendix.
As a first consequence of this theorem, we find that stability is a ubiquitous property
of ex ante social choice rules, even weaker than IIA. By asking for stability, we are clearly
not asking for too much. In the next section where we will find that the situation is very
different for ex post social choice rules. All non–exceptional ex post social choice rules,
whether they are IIA or not, are instable under refinements. Instabilities can therefore be
counted as a defect of the ex post mode that is easily avoided by the ex ante mode. As a
second consequence of the theorem, we obtain additional reasons why we should require
social choice rules to be IIA. These are the same three reasons that we have offered for
requiring social choice rules to be stable under refinements. If the domain of social choice
rules is closed under restrictions, the theorem shows that we have to require IIA if we
desire stability under refinements.
3 Ex Post Aggregation
Numerical example
We start with an illustration of instability theorem for individuals who maximize expected
utility. We will see that this restriction, along with other simplifications, is not essen-
tial and that the result generalizes to most known decision theories and to almost any
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conceivable ex post aggregation rules. We impose no restrictions on group choices other
than an extremely weak dominance condition (absolute dominance) for binary choices.
On the other hand, we work with a very stringent notion of refinements of individual
decision–theoretic models. Despite this strong constraint on individuals’ models, we will
discover a severe ex post instability in which the group oscillates ad infinitum between
absolute dominance of f over g and absolute dominance of g over f .7
We follow Savage (1954) and represent acts as functions from states to consequences.8
We will eventually replace the worlds of a conventional model with the elements of a
partition W (Savage’s ‘small worlds’) and replace conventional consequences with the
elements of a partition C (our ‘small consequences’). Expected utility maximizers eval-
uate these acts by the probabilities of states in W and the utilities of consequences in
C. For simplicity’s sake, our verbal exposition of the numerical example continues to
consider only partitions of consequences and assumes that probabilities for consequences
are induced by some suitably defined act and some suitably defined partition of worlds
(cf. the appendix for details). As before, let Γ be a non–empty set, called a frame of
reference for consequences. We assume that Γ is at least countably infinite. We say that
C is a (finite) Γ–partition if and only if C is a finite collection of non–empty and mutually
disjoint sets the union of which is Γ. A Γ–partition C represents the degree of detail with
which the model describes the decision situation at hand. We say that p is a probability
on C exactly when p : C → [0, 1] and ∑C∈C p(c) = 1. Acts now induce probabilities
for the consequences in C. We again simplify our discussion by considering only two
acts f and g that induce probabilities pf and pg on C. A (real–valued one–dimensional)
utility on C is a function u : C → R. An expected utility maximizer’s model is therefore
characterized by the quadruple M = 〈C, pf , pg, u〉. Define UM(f) :=
∑
C∈C u(C) · pf (C)
as the expected utility of f in model M . Define UM(g) analogously.
The instability of group choices under ex post aggregation is a fairly obvious phe-
nomenon if an individual’s detailed model disagrees with the individual’s coarse model
on probabilities for coarse events. Savage (1954) points out that the agreement of prefer-
ences on coarse acts does not in itself guarantee the agreement of probabilities on coarse
events (‘small–world problem’). Such probability agreement imposes an additional con-
straint which we will include in our definition of a refinement of an individual’s model.9
A partition C ′ details a partition C exactly when each partition cell of C is itself parti-
tioned by some more fine–grained partition cells in C ′. When C ′ details C, when p is a
probability on C and when p′ is a probability on C ′, we say that p′ refines p if and only
7Other authors have provides some examples of a single instability under the assumption that the
group maximizes expected utility. Leeds (1990) provides what is effectively such an example in an attack
on Levi’s decision theory with indeterminate probabilities. Seidenfeld (1993) uses an example of this
sort (involving state–dependent utilities) in a critique of Levi’s robust aggregation. A numerical example
with an infinity of group preference reversals is reported in Hild/Jeffrey/Risse (2001).
8Cf. Hild 2001c for a version of the theorem that does not presuppose a separation of states and
consequences.
9We thus presuppose that the elicitation of probabilities does not draw on preferences alone but
also uses some additional factor, such as external randomization by roulette–lotteries or a primitive
qualitative probability relation (cf. Schervish/Seidenfeld/Kadane, 1990).
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if p and p′ agree on all coarse–grained consequences, i.e., p(C) = p′(C) for all C ∈ C. In
addition to the invariance of probabilities on coarse–grained consequences, we will require
that refinements of the individuals’ models leave not only the individuals’ preferences but
also their expected utilities unchanged. If it were not for our interest in the instability
theorem, we might wish to speak of an individual refinement already when individual
preferences are left unchanged. With our stringent definition of individual refinements,
however, we will obtain a strong instability result because our proofs will construct a
group choice reversal even for individual refinements in which the evaluations of acts
remain unchanged. To summarize, we say that an EU–model M ′ = 〈C ′, p′f , p′g, u′〉 refines
an EU–model M = 〈C ′, p′f , p′g, u′〉 if and only if C ′ details C, p′f refines pf , p′g refines pg,
UM(f) = UM ′(f) and UM(g) = UM ′(g).
For concreteness, we consider two individuals whose utilities are aggregated by taking
their average u0 =
u1+u2
2
. We construct a sequence of individual refinements with two
acts f and g such that, for any model in the sequence, both individuals’ expected utility
for f is 1 while their expected utility for g is 0. We here provide an intuitive sketch of the
construction. The formal definition of this example is provided in appendix A. Starting
from the Γ–partition {C,D}, we construct an infinite sequence of increasingly detailed
Γ–partitions. In each of these partitions, we continue to partition C into an increasing
number of sets each of which is, in turn, subdivided in the subsequent partition. The
construction and indexing of the partition elements is illustrated in Figure 1.
We define g as an act that yields the consequence D with necessity, or in all possible
states of the world. We define f as an act that, in all possible states of the world,
yields some consequence from the C partition. The individuals differ in their probability
judgments for the consequences of f . For the first four partitions, the upper part of
Figure 1 shows the individual probabilities for the consequences if f is performed (i.e.,
pn1,f and p
n
2,f for n = 0, 1, 2, 3). The middle part of the same figure shows the individual
utilities for consequences in the first four partitions. In the second partition, for example,
the consequence C1 has utility 3 for individual 1 and utility −5 for individual 2. The
consequence D always has utility 0 for both individuals. The essence of this example
lies in the individuals’ strong disagreements about probabilities and utilities. With these
values fixed, we find that the sequence of individual models 〈Mni 〉n∈N (i = 1, 2) is indeed
a sequence of refinements (Un1 (f) = U
n
2 (f) = 1 and U
n
1 (g) = U
n
2 (g) = 0, for all n ∈ N).10
We also find severe violations of stability.
Applying averaging to the individuals’ utilities, we find that, in even numbered mod-
els, the group values all possible consequences of f at +1, while, in odd numbered models,
the group values all possible consequences of f at −1 (i.e., un0 (Ck1,...,kn) = (−1)n for all
n ∈ N). At the same time, the only possible consequence of g is always valued at 0
10We remark that the elements in this sequence of individual models not only refine each other in the
sense that we have define. They are moreover local refinements of each other in the sense that Mn+1i
refines Mni and u
n
i (X) =
∑
C∈Cn+1 u
n+1
i (C) · Pn+11,f (C|X) for all X ∈ Cn with Pn+11,f (X) > 0 and all
f ∈ F . In a model Mn+1 that locally refines Mn, the consequences X ∈ Cn of the coarse model are
treated as uncertain prospects with the distribution Pn+1f (.|X) and their expected utility equals the
(risk–free) utility of X in the coarse model.
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n individual probabilities pn1 , p
n
2 for consequences of f
0 C D
1, 1 0, 0
1 C1 C2 D
3
4 ,
1
4
1
4 ,
3
4 0, 0
2 C11 C12 C21 C22 D
9
16 ,
1
16
3
16 ,
3
16
3
16 ,
3
16
1
16 ,
9
16 0, 0
3 C111 C112 C121 C122 C211 C212 C221 C222 D
27
64 ,
1
64
9
64 ,
3
64
9
64 ,
3
64
3
64 ,
9
64
9
64 ,
3
64
3
64 ,
9
64
3
64 ,
9
64
1
64 ,
27
64 0, 0
n individual utilities un1 , u
n
2
0 C D
1, 1 0, 0
1 C1 C2 D
3,−5 −5, 3 0, 0
2 C11 C12 C21 C22 D
1, 1 9,−7 −7, 9 1, 1 0, 0
3 C111 C112 C121 C122 C211 C212 C221 C222 D
3,−5 −5, 3 11,−13 3,−5 −5, 3 −13, 11 3,−5 −5, 3 0, 0
n group utilities un0
0 C D
1 0
1 C1 C2 D
−1 −1 0
2 C11 C12 C21 C22 D
1 1 1 1 0
3 C111 C112 C121 C122 C211 C212 C221 C222 D
−1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 0
Figure 1: Individual probabilities, individual utilities and group utilities for n = 0, 1, 2, 3.
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(i.e., un0 (D) = 0 for all n ∈ N). For the first four partitions, the lower part of Figure 1
tabulates these group utilities. We express the relationship between f and g by saying
that f absolutely dominates g according to the group’s utilities in any even numbered
model while g absolutely dominates f according to the group’s utilities in any odd num-
bered model. It therefore matters little what decision rule the group uses as long as the
group strongly prefers strongly dominating acts. To mention but one example of a group
decision rule, the group could aggregate the individuals’ probabilities into a group prob-
ability and then maximize expected utility relative to the group probability and group
utility. Notice, however, that our result makes no assumptions about the existence or
properties of group beliefs. Another strength of our numerical example is the repetition
of this strong instability ad infinitum as we refine individual models to higher and higher
degrees.
Fine–graining
We turn to Savage’s representation of acts and explicitly accommodate it in our notion of
a refinement. Let Ω be a non–empty set, called a frame of reference for states and let Γ
be a non–empty set, called a frame of reference for consequences. We assume that both
Ω and Γ are at least countably infinite. Throughout, we will only construct models with
a finite number of states W ∈ W and consequences C ∈ C.11 With this presupposition,
we say thatW is a (finite) Ω–partition if and only ifW is a finite collection of non–empty
and mutually disjoint sets the union of which is Ω. We use the analogous definition of
a Γ–partition. We say that 〈W , C〉 is a graining if and only if W is an Ω–partition and
C is a Γ–partition. Let [W ] := {⋃X|X ⊆ W} be the set of all events expressible in
W . Analogously, let [C] := {⋃X|X ⊆ C}. A graining 〈W ′, C ′〉 details a graining 〈W , C〉
exactly when W ⊆ [W ′] and C ⊆ [C ′]. For any Γ–partition C, let C(c) be the partition
cell of C that contains c ∈ Γ. We thus take the liberty to identify a partition C with a
particular function from Γ onto C.
The objects of our primary interest are 〈W , C〉–grained acts represented as functions
F : W → C that map W–grained states into C–grained consequences. We then want
to consider more finely grained representations of these acts. We already pointed out
in Section 2 that the number of possible 〈W , C〉–grained acts increases as the graining
〈W , C〉 is replaced by a more detailed graining 〈W ′, C ′〉 (i.e., |CW | ≤ |(C ′)(W ′)|). What
is more, that there are generally several alternative ways of adding details to the coarse
description of an act. In other words, if a graining 〈W ′, C ′〉 details a graining 〈W , C〉, there
11From the axiomatic viewpoint of Savage’s approach, our restriction to models with a finite number of
small worlds is not without problems (cf. Savage’s postulate (P6)). Note, however, that all our definitions
and proofs go through for partitions W with infinitely many partition cells and only finitely additive
probability measures on W. Infinite partitions W lead to complications, however, once we consider
σ–additive probability measures defined on some σ–algebra. We then have to ensure the measurability
of the acts which we construct. Although this can be done, restrictions of the sort we would lead to a
loss of generality in other places. Finally, we can allow C to contain infinitely many partition cells as
long as we are prepared to use the axiom of choice.
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are several 〈W ′, C ′〉–grained acts F ′ :W ′ → C ′ that we could consider as a more detailed
description of a coarse–grained act F : W → C. Thus, we need a means of identifying
those fine–grained acts that count as refined descriptions of a given coarse–grained act.
To achieve this end, we define a reference act as a function f : Ω→ Γ from the frame of
reference for states to the frame of reference for consequences and then define the family
of 〈W , C〉–grained acts induced by f .12 Let Φ := ΓΩ be the frame of reference for acts.
For any graining 〈W , C〉, we say that an act f : Ω → Γ is compatible with 〈W , C〉 if and
only if C(f(ω)) = C(f(ω′)) for all W ∈ W and all ω, ω′ ∈ W . Hence, points ω, ω′ ∈ Ω
in the same partition cell of W must lead to points c = f(ω), c′ = f(ω′) in the same
partition cell of C. Let ΦW,C be the set of acts that are compatible with 〈W , C〉. For any
act f ∈ ΦW,C, we can then define the 〈W , C〉–graining of f as the function F : W → C
such that F (W ) := C(f(ω)) for any ω ∈ W . A decision–theoretic model with a graining
〈W , C〉 will contain only acts that are compatible with 〈W , C〉. Moreover, we repeat
that our primary interest is not in reference acts but in the 〈W , C〉–graining of reference
acts. The purpose of a reference act f : Ω → Γ is to perform as an identifier of those
fine–grained acts that count as more detailed descriptions of a coarse–grained act. We
therefore require the choice set of a decision–theoretic model to contain at most one
reference act f : Ω → Γ for each possible 〈W , C〉–grained act F : W → C. For any
graining 〈W , C〉, we say that a set F ⊆ ΦW,C is unambiguous w.r.t. 〈W , C〉 if and only
if no two reference acts in F have the same 〈W , C〉–graining. Using these terms, we will
require that the choice set in a decision–theoretic model is unambiguous.
Generalized decision–theory
We now remove the example’s narrow assumptions about the types of decision models
used to describe the individuals. The discussion in this subsection will, therefore, be
considerably more abstract. The reader may wish to consult the applications in the fol-
lowing section in order to appreciate the purpose of studying this generalized framework.
As far as decision theory is concerned, we will mainly assume that individual utilities
depend only on consequences and that consequences enter the evaluation of acts only
through their utilities. We allow utilities to take values on some arbitrary scale and
thus subsume real–valued one–dimensional utilities, real–valued multi–dimensional util-
ities and any ordinal preference relation over consequences including relations that are
not orderings. We also make a generalized notion of a decision rule available that sub-
sumes decision rules based on monadic evaluations (e.g., expected utility maximization),
decision rules based on binary evaluations (e.g., regret theory) and any ordinal decision
rule under which the relative ranking of any two acts depends only on those acts and on
no other act, i.e., any ordinal decision rule that is independent of irrelevant alternatives
(e.g., decision–theoretic leximin or leximax). Thus, the only types of decision theories not
12Savage takes ‘small–world acts’ to be functions from W to the set ΓΩ, i.e. function from small
worlds to what are acts in the basic framework. Given one model with small worlds and another with
bigger worlds, it is therefore always clear which bigger–world act is detailed by a smaller–world act. I
differ from Savage by introducing the notion of ‘small consequences’ and by considering sequences of
increasingly fine–grained descriptions of an act.
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covered by our framework are decision theories in which the utilities of consequences do
not depend on consequences alone (e.g., Becker/Sarin’s (1987) lottery–dependent utility
theory where the utility of consequences depends on the gamble in which they occur)13
and decision theories in which the relative ranking of two acts may depend on other acts
in the choice set.
We say that p is a belief type if and only if p maps any Ω–partitionW into a (possibly
empty) set p(W). For any Ω–partition, we call any p ∈ p(W) a p–belief measure on W .
Examples of a belief type are set of all real valued set functions p : [W ] → R, or the
set of all probabilities on W . Another example of a belief measure is any set K ⊆ W
that dichotomizes the states in W into those considered subjectively possible and those
considered subjectively impossible. An additional non–triviality constraint on the belief
types that occur in the individual’s decision–theoretic models will be introduced below
(disagreement condition). All three examples satisfy this constraint.
u is a utility type if and only if there is some (non–empty) set Z such that u ∈ u iff
there is some Γ–partition C with u : C → Z. u(C) is the set of all functions in u with
domain C; we call any u ∈ u(C) a u–utility on C. A scale is a pair 〈Z,D〉 where Z is some
non–empty set and D is a binary relation on Z with z1, z2 ∈ Z such that 〈z1, z2〉 ∈ D
but 〈z2, z1〉 /∈ D (in which case we write ‘z1 B z2’). We say that D is a scale relation
for the utility type u if and only if 〈Z,D〉 is a scale and Z is the union of the domain of
all functions in u. We earlier considered the special class of real–valued one–dimensional
utilities u : C → R (with the canonical scale relation ≥ on R). Our general definition also
admits real–valued multi–dimensional utilities u : C → RL (for some L ∈ N+) and thus
allows us to accommodate models like that of Machina (1982). For a multi-dimensional
utility u : C → RL, we define the following scale relation on RL: For 〈al〉, 〈bl〉 ∈ RL, let
〈al〉 D 〈bl〉 :iff either al = bl for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L, or al > bl for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L. Let r be the
set of all r such that there is some Γ–partition C on which r is a binary relation. Let
r(C) be the set of all binary relations on C. For any u ∈ u(C) and r ∈ r(C), we say that
u D–represents r if and only if C r D iff u(C) D u(D) for all C,D ∈ C. There exists a
utility type u with a scale relation D such that for any Γ–partition C, (1) any r ∈ r(C)
is D–represented by some u ∈ u(C) and (2) any u ∈ u(C) represents some r ∈ r(C). We
can thus identify r with a particular utility type.
Our concept of a decision rule requires that consequences enter into the evaluation of
an act only via their utilities (property (b)). We make no assumptions about the scale
on which decision rules evaluate acts. For any belief type p and any utility type u, G is a
(binary) decision rule for 〈p,u〉 if and only if (a)G is a function such that, for any graining
〈W , C〉, any p ∈ p(W), any u ∈ u(C) and any f, g ∈ ΦW,C, the quadruple 〈p, u, f, g〉 is in
the domain of G, and (b) for any grainings 〈W , C〉 and 〈W , C ′〉 with C ⊆ [C ′], any p ∈
p(W), any u ∈ u(C), any u′ ∈ u(C ′) and any f, g ∈ ΦW,C′ :14 If u(C(f(.))) = u′(C ′(f(.)))
and u(C(g(.))) = u′(C ′(g(.))), then G(p, u, f, g) = G(p, u′, f, g). We say that a decision
rule G is monadic if and only if G(p, u, f, g) = G(p, u, f, h) for any 〈p, u, f, g〉, 〈p, u, f, h〉
13We can, however, allow state–dependent utilities; cf. Hild (2001c).
14N.b.: If C ⊆ [C′], then ΦW,C′ ⊆ ΦW,C .
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in the domain of G. For monadic decision rules, we define G(p, u, f) := G(p, u, f, f) for
any 〈p, u, f, f〉 in the domain of G. In the following examples, we keep p, u fixed and
write V (f, g) := G(p, u, f, g) and V (f) := G(p, u, f, f). Expected utility maximization
is an example of a monadic decision rule in which a preference f  g may be defined
by V (f) > V (g) or by V (f) − V (g) > α for some threshold α ∈ R+ (cf. Fishburn,
1988). Loomes/Sugden’s (1982) regret theory provides an example of a genuinely binary
decision rule in which a preference f  g is defined by V (f, g) > V (g, f). Finally, any
ordinal decision rules, such as leximin or leximax, in which the relative ranking R of any
two acts depends only on those two acts can also be represented by a binary decision rule
VR(f, g) defined as the characteristic function of the rule’s ordinal preference R over f, g
(i.e., VR : F2 → {0, 1} is defined by VR(f, g) := 1 if 〈f, g〉 ∈ R and VR(f, g) := 0 else).
We define a set of consequences to be null relative to a belief measure and a decision
rule exactly when the utility assignments to the consequences in the set have no influence
on the evaluation of acts. For any Ω–partition W , any belief type p, any utility type u,
any binary decision rule G for 〈p,u〉, any p ∈ p(W) and any A ∈ [W ], we say that A
is p,G–null if and only if for any Γ–partition C, any u, u′ ∈ u(C) and any f, f ′, g, g′ ∈
ΦW,C: If u(C(f(ω))) = u′(C(f ′(ω))) and u(C(g(ω))) = u′(C(g′(ω))) for all ω ∈ −A, then
G(p, u, f, g) = G(p, u, f ′, g′). Any A is p,G–one if and only if −A is p,G–null.
Finally, M = 〈W ,p, p, C,u,D, u,F , G〉 is a (generalized) decision–theoretic model if
and only if W is an Ω–partition, p is a belief type, p ∈ p(W), C is a Γ–partition, u is
a utility type, D is a scale relation for u, u ∈ u(C) , F ⊆ ΦW,C is unambiguous w.r.t.
〈W , C〉, and G is a decision rule for 〈p,u〉. We define WM , pM , pM , CM , uM , DM , uM ,
FM , and GM to be the entities such that M = 〈WM ,pM , pM , CM ,uM ,DM , uM ,FM , GM〉.
The binary evaluation function associated with M is the function VM : F2M → range(G)
such that VM(f, g) := GM(pM , uM , f, g) for all f, g ∈ FM . If GM is monadic, then the
monadic evaluation function associated with M is the function VM : FM → range(G)
such that VM(f) := VM(f, f) for all f ∈ FM .
Let G(I) be the set of all vectors 〈Mi〉 of decision–theoretic models such that (1)
WMi = WMj , CMi = CMj and FMi = FMj (for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ I) and (2) there exists
some Ω–partition W = {W1, . . . ,WI} and some 〈pi〉 ∈
∏
i pMi(W) such that, for each
1 ≤ i ≤ I, Wi is pMi , GMi–one. For any 〈Mi〉 ∈ G(I), let W〈Mi〉 := WM1 , C〈Mi〉 := CM1 ,
and F〈Mi〉 := FM1 . Condition (1) allows the models in a vector 〈Mi〉 ∈ G(I) to have
different belief types, utility types, utility scales and decision rules. To simplify our
notation, we henceforth hold each individual’s belief type, utility type, utility scale and
decision rule fixed and assume that, for any 〈Mi〉 ∈ G(I), we have pi = pMi , ui = uMi ,
Di = DMi and Gi = GMi (for each 1 ≤ i ≤ I). In what follows, we therefore drop any
reference to these components when we specify a vector of models in G(I). Condition
(2) imposes our only constraint on the individuals’ belief types. We refer to condition
(2) as the disagreement condition.
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Ex post social choice rules
An ex post social choice rule yields a choice model M = 〈F , C〉 for the group as a
function of the individuals’ decision–theoretic models. We make no assumptions about
the existence of a group preference. Our definition merely requires ex post social choice
rules to yield choice functions over the same set of acts that is evaluated by the individuals
(clause 2), to aggregate individual utilities in a way that is not contaminated by beliefs
or evaluations of acts and, in binary choices, to choose absolutely dominant acts in a
sense that is much weaker than the sure–thing principle or related dominance conditions
(clause 3). Under Savage’s representation of acts, nothing needs to be said about the
existence of group beliefs or the aggregation of individual beliefs. We call s a utility
aggregation rule if and only if, for any Γ–partition C, s maps any vector 〈ui〉 ∈
∏
i ui(C)
to a choice function c on C (i.e., a function c : (2C − {∅})→ (2C − {∅}) with c(X) ⊆ X
for any X ⊆ C). We emphasize the generality of this concept. It subsumes the situation
of our numerical example where real–valued one–dimensional individual utilities were
aggregated into a real–valued one–dimensional group utility. Trivially, any group utility
and any acyclical group preference generates a group choice function over consequences.
Our concept of a utility aggregation rule avoids any rationality assumptions like the
weak axiom of revealed preference. An act f absolutely dominates an act g relative to
the group’s choice function on consequences exactly when any C–consequence of f is
preferred to any C–consequence of g in a binary choice. For any graining 〈W , C〉, any
choice function c on C and any f, g ∈ ΦW,C, we say that f absolutely dominates g w.r.t.
c if and only if c({C(f(ω)), C(g(ω′))}) = {C(f(ω))} for any ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. The two acts in
the numerical example display this property (cf. Figure 1).
Definition 3.1 S is an ex post social choice rule if and only if (1) there is some non–
empty set G ⊆ G(I) such that S : G → C, (2) for all 〈Mi〉 ∈ G, we have FS(〈Mi〉) = F〈Mi〉
and (3) there is some utility aggregation rule s such that for all 〈Mi〉 ∈ G and all f, g ∈
F〈Mi〉: If f absolutely dominates g, then CS(〈Mi〉)({f, g}) = {f}.
We call any s that satisfies condition (3) a utility aggregation rule associated with S.
An ex post social choice rule S has a wide domain if and only if, for any graining 〈W , C〉,
any 〈pi〉 ∈
∏
i pi(W), any 〈ui〉 ∈
∏
i ui(C) and any F ⊆ ΦW,C, there exists some 〈Mi〉 in
the domain of S such that W〈Mi〉 = W , 〈pMi〉 = 〈pi〉, C〈Mi〉 = C, 〈uMi〉 = 〈ui〉 and (*)
F ⊆ F〈Mi〉. Our definition of a ‘wide domain’ is in an important sense not a condition of
a ‘universal domain’. Firstly, the set of belief measures and utility measures that occur
in models in the domain of S can be severely restricted (as long as they respect the
definition of utility types and the disagreement condition). More importantly, the final
clause (*) of the definition allows the underlying structure of acts to force the inclusion of
certain acts into the choice set F〈Mi〉. An ex post social choice rule S with a wide domain
may, for example, be restricted to only those vectors 〈Mi〉 in which F〈Mi〉 contains (a
reference act for) each possible coarse–grained act F : W〈Mi〉 → C〈Mi〉. Domains thus
restricted introduce considerable technical complications during the proofs.
We now formulate several properties of utility aggregation rules. A Γ–partition C is
refinable if and only if every C ∈ C has at least two elements. Suppose s is a cardinal–
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ordinal utility aggregation rule. s is non–exceptional if and only if there exists some
refinable Γ–partition C, (possibly identical) consequences C1, . . . , CI , D1, . . . , DI ∈ C and
〈ui〉, 〈u′i〉 ∈
∏
i ui(C) such that for any 1 ≤ i, j, k ≤ I) ui(Ci) = u′i(Ci) and ui(Di) =
u′i(Di), but [s(〈ui〉)]({Cj, Dk}) = {Cj} and [s(〈u′i〉)]({Cj, Dk}) = {Dk}. For concreteness,
we mention already the special case in which s′ aggregates the individuals’ real–valued
one–dimensional utilities on C into a real–valued one–dimensional group utility on C
and where s is the utility aggregation rule generated by s′ (i.e., s yields the choice
function generated by the group utility aggregated by s′). If s′ is a utilitarian rule
with weights λi, then s is non–exceptional if and only if the weights of at least two
individuals are non–zero. By Observation A.2 in the appendix, a utility aggregation
rule must be non–exceptional if it is Pareto optimal (cf. below). s is independent of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if and only if, if ui(C) = u
′
i(C) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I and all
C ∈ X, then [s(〈ui〉)](X) = [s(〈u′i〉)](X) (for any Γ–partitions C and C ′, any X ⊆ C ∩ C ′
and any 〈ui〉 ∈
∏
i ui(C) and 〈u′i〉 ∈
∏
i ui(C ′)). Note that IIA forces the aggregation of
utilities to be independent of the fine–graining of the consequence partition. When, as is
usual in the literature, the consequence partition is held fixed, this aspect of IIA cannot
be expressed. Note, moreover, that IIA for utility aggregation rules (which deliver a
group choice function over consequences) is an extremely weak and ubiquitous condition
since we do not presuppose the existence of a group preference or an axiom of revealed
preference (cf. the applications in the following section and Plott, 1976). Our final
property involves the individuals’ utility scales Di. s is (ex post) Pareto optimal if and
only if [s(〈ui〉)]({C,D}) = {C} when ui(C) Di ui(D) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I but uj(C).j uj(D)
for some 1 ≤ j ≤ I (for any Γ–partition C, any C,D ∈ C and any 〈ui〉 ∈
∏
i ui(C)).
Instability theorem
For the sake of a strong instability result, we now rig our setup against instabilities
and formulate an excessively stringent notion of refinement for individual models. For
the group choice model, we use the same notion as in Section 2. We indulge ex post
aggregation in two excesses. On the one hand, we ask both that a refining model M ′ use
the same state partition as the model M being refined and that M ′ have exactly the same
belief measure as M . If it were not for our focus on instabilities, we would be satisfied if
the state partition in M ′ detailed the state partition in M (i.e., WM ⊆ [WM ′ ]) and if the
belief measure of M ′ refined the belief measure of M in a suitable sense (cf. our definition
on p. 11 in case pM and pM ′ are probabilities). On the other hand, we ask that not only
individual preferences but also individual evaluation functions remain unchanged in a
refinement. Again, if it were not for our interest in group choice reversals, we might
wish to speak of an individual refinement already when individual preferences are left
unchanged. With our excessively stringent definition, however, we obtain a stronger
instability result. Our proofs will construct blatant violations of a weak stability condition
for group choice based on individual models in which both beliefs and evaluations remain
untouched. For any vectors of decision–theoretic models 〈Mi〉, 〈M ′i〉 ∈ G(I), we say that
〈M ′i〉 stringently refines 〈Mi〉 if and only if, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ I, (1) W〈Mi〉 = W〈M ′i〉, (2)C〈Mi〉 ⊆ [C〈M ′i〉], (3) F〈Mi〉 ⊆ F〈M ′i〉, (4) pMi = pM ′i and (5) VMi(f, g) = VM ′i(f, g) for all
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f, g ∈ F〈Mi〉. Condition (5) implies that the individuals’ preferences over acts in F〈Mi〉
remain the same.15 An ex post social choice rule S is weakly stable under refinements
if and only if, for all 〈Mi〉, 〈M ′i〉 in the domain of S, S(〈M ′i〉) refines S(〈Mi〉) whenever
〈M ′i〉 stringently refines 〈Mi〉.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose S is an ex post social choice rule with a wide domain and an
associated utility aggregation rule that is (1) IIA and non–exceptional, or (2) Pareto
optimal.
Then there is an infinite sequence 〈Mni 〉n∈N of vectors of decision–theoretic models in
GS such that 〈Mn+1i 〉 stringently refines 〈Mni 〉 (for all n ∈ N) and S leads to a sequence of
group models 〈S(〈Mni 〉)〉n∈N that oscillates between absolute dominance of f over g and
absolute dominance of g over f (for some f, g ∈ F〈M0i 〉). Hence, S is not weakly stable
under refinements.
In our view, these results devastate the hope that ex post aggregation could offer a
viable alternative to ex ante aggregation. We recall that stability is a not an elusive
property. For ex ante social choice rules it is a ubiquitous property and even weaker
than IIA. Therefore, the combination of Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 3.2 supports the
conclusion that the ex post mode of aggregation cannot yield a normative theory of
fairness or of consensus formation. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to challenge
the importance of stability or to accept the choice of a graining for the individual models
as an additional factor in social choice. Moreover, Theorem 3.2 shows that instabilities
may persist even though we build increasingly fine–grained individual models. In the ex
post mode, instabilities are there to stay.
The proof of this theorem makes use of extreme disagreements of belief measures
where one individual regards a consequence as certain, or one, while another regards it
as impossible, or null (cf. the disagreement condition). The proof exploits the freedom
to change utilities of null events without affecting individuals’ preferences. If we make
stronger assumption about the individuals’ decision rule, for instance, that individuals
maximize expected utility, we can construct refinements suitable for the proof of the
theorem without resorting to such extreme disagreements of belief measures, as was the
case in the numerical example. The virtue of the current proof technique based on the
disagreement condition is its generality. We now consider applications of our theorem to
concrete models. We emphasize that instabilities are not the artifact of a narrow class
of decision theories. The theorem applies to all decision–theoretic models listed in the
following section.
15In case Gi is monadic, clause (5) reduces to VMi(f) = VM ′i (f) for all f ∈ F〈Mi〉. In case Gi is an
ordinal decision rule, this clause reduces to f RMi g iff f RM ′i g for all f, g ∈ F〈Mi〉.
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4 Applications
We now present an exemplary list of individual decision–theoretic models and utility
aggregation rules to which our results apply. Different individuals may be described by
any one of the models listed. Any of these models is a decision–theoretic models in the
sense of our definition and any of their combinations satisfies the disagreement condition
(p. 17). The group may or may not have any group beliefs and may or may not use a
belief aggregation rule. In a special case, the group aggregates individual utilities into a
group utility, aggregates individual beliefs into a group belief and then uses one of the
below decision–theoretic models to construct a preference on the basis of these aggregated
beliefs and aggregated utilities. Our results cover this special case since any of the models
listed satisfies absolute dominance.16
Utility aggregation
1.) Cardinal aggregation of real–valued one–dimensional utilities. Consider individuals
with real–valued one–dimensional utilities ui : C → R and a utility aggregation rule s′
that aggregates these utilities into a one–dimensional utility u0 : C → R. Any aggregation
rule s′ of this class generates a utility aggregation rule s in the sense of the definition. A
smaller subclass consists of those utility aggregation rules that are generated by functions
of the form t′ : RI → R and for which the aggregated utility s′(〈ui〉) on C is defined by
s′(〈ui〉)(C) := t′(〈ui(C)〉) for all C ∈ C. These aggregation rules are IIA iff the same
function t is used for the aggregation of utilities on any partition. Utilitarian aggregation
rules are generated by a linear function t′ : RI → R. Utilitarian rules are non–exceptional
iff at least two individuals’ weights are non–zero. If all weights of a utilitarian rule are
positive, then the rule is Pareto–optimal and satisfies the preconditions of Theorem 3.2
even if different weights are used for different partitions. If weights are independent of
the partition on which utilities are defined and if at least two weights are non–zero, the
rule also satisfies the preconditions of Theorem 3.2.
2.) Cardinal aggregation of real–valued multi–dimensional utilities. Restricting our-
selves to L = 2, we represent any two–dimensional utility u∗ : C → R2 by two one–
dimensional utilities u, v : C → R. A special class of utility aggregation rules for
two–dimensional utilities is generated by pairs 〈s′1, s′2〉 of cardinal–cardinal utility ag-
gregation rules for one–dimensional utilities by using s′1 and s
′
2 to aggregate the two
components of the individuals’ two–dimensional utility. Thus, the rule generated by
〈s′1, s′2〉 aggregates vectors of two–dimensional utilities (represented by) 〈ui, vi〉 into the
pair 〈s′1(〈ui〉), s′2(〈vi〉)〉. Given our definition of the canonical scale relation on RL (p. 16),
both s′1 and s
′
2 have any of the properties of non–exceptionality, IIA or Pareto optimality
16In the case of regret theory, the group’s modification function must be regular. In the case of
expected utility with threshold α0 ∈ R and an aggregated group utility u0, we define the group’s choice
function c on C such that, for any binary choices, c({C,D}) = {C} iff u0(C) − u0(D) > α0 (for any
C,D ∈ C). Then clause 3 of Definition 3.1 is satisfied.
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exactly when 〈s′1, s′2〉 has any of the corresponding properties. The reader may therefore
refer back to the cardinal aggregation of one–dimensional utilities.
3.) Ordinal aggregation. A utility aggregation rule that only yields an ordinal prefer-
ence over consequences does not furnish the cardinal information required by most of the
decision theories on our list. Under ordinal aggregation, the group will therefore have to
make use of an ordinal decision theory, such as decision–theoretic leximin or leximax (cf.
below). Allocative leximin constructs a group preference over consequences by maximiz-
ing, first, the utility enjoyed by the worst–off individual, then the utility enjoyed by the
second–worst–off individual etc. (cf. Sen, 1970). Allocative leximax is an opposing rule
that constructs a group preference by maximizing, first, the utility enjoyed by the best–off
individual, then the utility enjoyed by the second–best–off individual etc. (cf. Sen, 1970).
The de Borda count constructs a group choice by assigning (a positive number of) points
to consequences according to the rank that these consequences hold in each individuals’
preference (or, utility) ranking and then choosing the consequences with the greatest
number of points summed across individuals. Since we do not assume that utility aggre-
gation rules yield a group preference over consequences (but merely a choice function),
the de Borda count is IIA in the sense of the definition in Section 3. All three examples
are, therefore, non–exceptional, IIA and Pareto optimal and satisfy the preconditions
of Theorem 3.2. We end with a forth example that highlights non–exceptionality. For
any 1 ≤ α ≤ I, α–Pareto preference constructs a group preference 0 over consequences
such that C 0 D iff ui(C) Di ui(D) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I but uj(C) .j uj(D) for at least α
different j (1 ≤ j ≤ I). α–Pareto preference is IIA for any α. However, unless α = 1
(Sen’s (1970) Pareto extension rule), the rule is not Pareto optimal in the sense defined.
Since the rule is non–exceptional iff 1 ≤ α ≤ I − 1, only I–Pareto preference satisfies
none of the preconditions of Theorem 3.2.
Decision theories
Some of the following models have originally been proposed for agents’ choices among
roulette lotteries with fixed objective probabilities (especially, weighted utility and Machina).
To explore the generality of our result, we extend this interpretation and allow individu-
als to use their own subjective probabilities. In what follows, we hold the graining 〈W , C〉
fixed and assume that F, F1, F2 : W → C are the 〈W , C〉–grainings of f, f1, f2 ∈ ΦW,C.
Under any of the following decision rules using probabilities, an event A ∈ [W ] is null
w.r.t. a probability p and the decision rule in question if and only if p(A) = 0.
Expected utility. Beliefs are represented by probabilities pi on W and agents possess
real–valued one–dimensional utilities ui on C. Agents maximize the expectation E(pi, ui◦
F ) of ui ◦ F w.r.t. pi. Since our proofs construct only models with finite partitions of
states, we avoid the issue of merely finitely vs. countably additive probabilities.17
17We can modify the proofs for state partitions with infinitely many partition cells by introducing a
suitable σ–algebra on which σ–additive probabilities are defined in a way that makes the acts constructed
in the proof measurable.
22
Expected utility with threshold. Beliefs are represented by probabilities pi on W and
agents possess real–valued one–dimensional utilities ui on C and a threshold αi ∈ R.
Agents’ strongly prefer f1 to f2 exactly when E(pi, ui◦F1)−E(pi, ui◦F2) > αi (Fishburn,
1988).
Choquet–expected utility. Beliefs are represented by capacities pi on W and agents
maximize the Choquet–expectation of real–valued one–dimensional utilities ui on C (Gilboa,
1987, Schmeidler, 1989). p is a capacity on W iff p : [W ] → R, p(∅) = 0, p(Ω) = 1 and
p is monotonic w.r.t. set inclusion. Agents maximize the Choquet–expectation of u ◦ F
w.r.t. p defined by C(p, u ◦ F ) := ∫∞
0
p(u ◦ F ≥ x) dx + ∫ 0−∞[p(u ◦ F ≥ x) − 1] dx.
In the present setting, Choquet–expected utility theory subsumes Quiggin’s (1982) rank
dependent utility theory. In rank dependent utility theory, an event A ∈ [W ] is null
w.r.t. p if and only if p(A) = 0. In contrast, an event A ∈ [W ] is null w.r.t. a capacity p
and Choquet–expectation if and only if p(B) = p(B ∩ A) for all B ∈ [W ].
Probability transforms. Beliefs are represented by probabilities pi on W , agents pos-
sess real–valued one–dimensional utilities ui on C and, in addition, a probability trans-
formation function pii : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] that is normalized to pii(0) = 0 and pii(1) = 1. This
transformation function may differ across agents. Agents maximize E(pii ◦pi, ui ◦F ) (Ed-
wards, 1955, Kahneman/Tversky, 1979) or E(pii◦pi, ui◦F )/E(pii◦pi,1) where 1 : C 7→ 1,
1 : C → R (Karmarkar, 1978).
Weighted utility theory. Agents posses subjective probabilities pi onW and two real–
valued one–dimensional utilities ui, vi on C. Agents maximize the function E(pi, [ui ◦
F ])/E(pi, [vi ◦ F ]) (Chew 1983, Fishburn, 1983).
Machina. Beliefs are represented by probabilities pi on W and agents are endowed
with a two–dimensional utility or, equivalently, with two one–dimensional utilities ui, vi :
C → R. Agents maximize Machina’s (1982) functional defined by Vi(f) := E(pi, ui ◦F )+
1
2
E(pi, vi ◦ F )2.
Regret. Agents are characterized by subjective probabilities pi on W , real–valued
one–dimensional utilities ui on C and a ‘modification function’ Mi : R2 → R. Define the
regret functional by Vi(f1, f2) := E(pi,Mi(ui ◦F1, ui ◦F2 (Loomes/Sugden, 1982). Agents
hold preferences such that f1 i f2 iff Vi(f1, f2) ≥ Vi(f2, f1). A modification function
M is regular if and only if M(x, x) = x (for any x ∈ R), M(., y) is strictly increasing
increasing (for any y ∈ R) and M(x, .) is non–increasing (for any x ∈ R).
Leximin or leximax. Agents are equipped with real–valued one–dimensional utilities
ui or orderings ri on C. Beliefs are represented by a non–empty ‘possibility set’ Ki ⊆ W
(e.g., the support of a probability measure pi onW) which dichotomizes states into those
considered possible and those considered impossible by the agent’s lights. Decision–
theoretic leximin w.r.t. all consequences in the possibility set Ki maximizes the worst–
case outcome in {F (W )|W ∈ Ki} and, in case of a tie, the second–worst outcome etc.
Decision–theoretic leximax w.r.t. all consequences in the possibility set Ki maximizes the
best–case outcome in {F (W )|W ∈ Ki} and, in case of a tie, the second–best outcome
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etc.18 Any A ∈ [W ] is null w.r.t. a possibility set K and decision–theoretic leximin
(leximax) if and only if A ⊆ −⋃K.
18We assume that W has M ∈ N+ elements. Agents following decision–theoretic leximin hold pref-
erences such that (1) f1 i f2 iff there are bijections σ, τ : {1, . . . ,M} → W with [ui ◦ F1](σ(1)) ≤
. . . ≤ [ui ◦ F1](σ(M)) and [ui ◦ F2](τ(1)) ≤ . . . ≤ [ui ◦ F2](τ(M)) and there exists 1 ≤ m ≤ M such
that [ui ◦ F1](σ(m)) > [ui ◦ F2](σ(m)) while, for all 1 ≤ l < m, [ui ◦ F1](σ(l)) = [ui ◦ F2](σ(l)); and (2)
f1 ∼i f2 iff there are bijections σ, τ : {1, . . . ,M} → W with [ui ◦ F1](σ(1)) ≤ . . . ≤ [ui ◦ F1](σ(M)) and
[ui ◦ F2](τ(1)) ≤ . . . ≤ [ui ◦ F2](τ(M)) such that [ui ◦ F1](σ(m)) = [ui ◦ F2](σ(m)) for all 1 ≤ m ≤M .
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Appendix A Proofs
Ex ante aggregation
Theorem 2.2 Proof: 1.) Trivial. 2.) Suppose S is an ex ante social choice rule that is IIA. Suppose,
moreover, that V is the domain of S and 〈F , Vi〉, 〈F ′, V ′i 〉 ∈ V. Suppose that X ⊆ F ∩F ′. If V is closed
under restrictions, then 〈X,Vi|X〉 ∈ V. Moreover, 〈X,Vi|X〉 refines both 〈F , Vi〉 and 〈F ′, V ′i 〉. If S is
stable under refinements, we then obtain CS(〈F,Vi〉)(X) = CS(〈X,Vi|X〉)(X) = CS(〈F ′,V ′i 〉)(X). 
Numerical Example
The following definition provides the construction rule behind this example. We borrow definitions and
notation from later parts of Section 3. Assume that both Ω and Γ are countably infinite. Take some
d ∈ Γ and define C := Γ−{d} and D := {d}. Now take a sequence 〈Cn〉 of partitions of C with C0 = {C}
and Cn = {Ck1,...,kn |k1 = 1, 2; . . . ; kn = 1, 2} such that Ck1,...,kn,1 and Ck1,...,kn,2 are two non–empty sets
that partition Ck1,...,kn (for all n ∈ N and all k1 = 1, 2; . . . ; kn = 1, 2). By assumption, there is a
bijection f : Ω → Γ − {d}. Define the sequence 〈Wn〉 of partitions of Ω by Wn := {f−1(X)|X ∈ Cn}
where f−1(X) is the image of X under f−1 (for any n ∈ N). Hence, the 〈Wn, Cn ∪ {D}〉–graining
of f is a function F : Wn → Cn ∪ {D} such that F (Wk1,...,kn) = Ck1,...,kn (for all n ∈ N and all
k1 = 1, 2; . . . ; kn = 1, 2). Define g(ω) := d for all ω ∈ Ω. Hence, the 〈Wn, Cn ∪ {D}〉–graining of g is a
function F :Wn → Cn ∪{D} such that F (Wk1,...,kn) = D (for all n ∈ N and all k1 = 1, 2; . . . ; kn = 1, 2).
Let Mni := 〈Wn, pni , Cn ∪ {D}, uni , {f, g}, Uni 〉 where pni and uni are as defined below and Uni evaluates
acts in terms of their expected utility w.r.t. pni and u
n
i (for i = 1, 2, n ∈ N). For all n ∈ N and all
k1 = 1, 2; . . . ; kn = 1, 2, let:
pn1 (Wk1,...,kn) := (
3
4
)one(k1,...,kn) · (1
4
)two(k1,...,kn)
pn2 (Wk1,...,kn) := (
1
4
)one(k1,...,kn) · (3
4
)two(k1,...,kn)
where one(k1, . . . , kn) and two(k1, . . . , kn) are the number of 1’s and 2’s contained in the string
k1, . . . , kn, respectively. For the empty string (n = 0), we have one() = two() = 0. Next, we define un1 (.)
recursively by u01(C) := 1 and, for all n ∈ N+:
un1 (Ck1,...,kn−1,1) := u
n−1
1 (Ck1,...,kn−1) + (−1)n+12
un1 (Ck1,...,kn−1,2) := u
n−1
1 (Ck1,...,kn−1) + (−1)n6
Finally, set un2 (Ck1,...,kn) := (−1)n2 − un1 (Ck1,...,kn) and un1 (D) := un2 (D) := 0 (for all n ∈ N). For
all n ∈ N, we obtain the group utilities by averaging (un0 = u
n
1 +u
n
2
2 ): u
n
0 (D) = 0 and u
n
0 (Ck1,...,kn) =
1
2 (u
n
1 (Ck1,...,kn) + (−1)n2− un1 (Ck1,...,kn)) = (−1)n. We note that for all n ∈ N:
un1 (Ck1,...,kn) =
3
4
un+11 (Ck1,...,kn,1) +
1
4
un+11 (Ck1,...,kn,2) (1)
un2 (Ck1,...,kn) =
1
4
un+12 (Ck1,...,kn,1) +
3
4
un+12 (Ck1,...,kn,2) (2)
It is then easy to see that Uni (f) = 1 and U
n
i (g) = 0 and, hence, M
n+1
i refines M
n
i (for i = 1, 2
and any n ∈ N). Moreover, Equations (1), (2) show that Mn+1i locally refines Mni (for i = 1, 2 and
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any n ∈ N) in the sense defined in footnote 10. Finally, we find that un0 (D) = 0, u2n0 (Ck1,...,k2n) = 1
and u2n+10 (Ck1,...,k2n+1) = −1 (for any n ∈ N and all k1 = 1, 2; . . . ; k2n+1 = 1, 2). Hence, f absolutely
dominates g w.r.t. the group’s utility in even numbered models while g absolutely dominates f w.r.t.
the group’s utility in odd numbered models. 
Ex post aggregation
Lemma A.1 Suppose G is a decision rule for a belief type p and a utility type u. Suppose 〈W, C〉 and
〈W, C′〉 are grainings with C ⊆ [C′], f1, f2 ∈ ΦW,C′ , u ∈ u(C), u′ ∈ u(C′), p ∈ p(W) and A ∈ [W]. Then
If A is p,G–one and [u ◦ C ◦ fk](ω) = [u′ ◦ C′ ◦ fk](ω) for all ω ∈ A and k = 1, 2, then G(p, u, f1, f2) =
G(p, u′, f1, f2).
Proof: Suppose that A is p,G–one and [u ◦ C ◦ fk](ω) = [u′ ◦ C′ ◦ fk](ω) for all ω ∈ A and k = 1, 2.
Let v ∈ u(C′) be the function such that v(X) := u(C) for all C ∈ C and X ∈ C′ with X ⊆ C. Hence,
[v ◦ C′ ◦ fk](ω) = [u ◦ C ◦ fk](ω) for all ω ∈ Ω and k = 1, 2. By property (b) of a decision rule, we then
have G(p, v, f1, f2) = G(p, u, f1, f2). Since A is p,G–one, we also have G(p, v, f1, f2) = G(p, u′, f1, f2).
Hence, G(p, u, f1, f2) = G(p, u′, f1, f2). 
Recall in what follows that we have fixed each individual’s belief type pi, utility type ui, scale
〈Zi,Di〉 and decision rule Gi (for each 1 ≤ i ≤ I).
Lemma A.2 Suppose s is a cardinal–ordinal utility aggregation rule that is (1) IIA and non–exceptional,
or (2) Pareto optimal. Then there exist vij , w
i
j ∈ Zi with vii = wii and vii+I = wii+I (1 ≤ i ≤ I,
1 ≤ j ≤ 2I) such that for all Γ–partitions C with 2 · I different consequences Y1, . . . , Y2I ∈ C and for
all 〈ui〉, 〈u′i〉 ∈
∏
i ui(C), ui(Yj) = vij and u′i(Yj) = wij (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2I), we have
[s(〈ui〉)]({Yl, Ym}) = {Yl} but [s(〈u′i〉)]({Yl, Ym}) = {Ym} (for all 1 ≤ l ≤ I and I + 1 ≤ m ≤ 2I).
Proof: Recall that 〈Zi,Di〉 is individual i’s scale for her utility type ui. 1.) Trivial. 2.) Suppose s is
Pareto optimal. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ I, let 0i,1i ∈ Zi such that 1i Bi 0i. Let C be a partition with mutually
non–identical consequences Y1, . . . , Y2I ∈ C and let ui, u′i ∈ ui(C) such that ui(Yi) = ui(YI+i) = 0i,
ui(Yj) = 1i, ui(YI+j) = 0i and u′i(Yi) = u
′
i(YI+i) = 0i, u
′
i(Yj) = 0i, u
′
i(YI+j) = 1i (for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ I
with i 6= j). Hence, ui(Yi) = u′i(Yi) and ui(Yi+I) = u′i(Yi+I) (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I). If s is Pareto optimal, we
obtain [s(〈ui〉)]({Yl, Ym}) = {Yl} but [s(〈u′i〉)]({Yl, Ym}) = {Ym} (for all 1 ≤ l ≤ I and I + 1 ≤ m ≤ 2I).

Theorem 3.2 Proof: Suppose S is an ex post social choice rule with a wide domain and s is a
utility aggregation rule associated with S. Suppose furthermore that (1) s is IIA and non–exceptional,
or (2) s is Pareto optimal. By assumption, Γ is at least countably infinite and, thus, we can partition
it into 2 · I different, at least countably infinite, sets X1, . . . , X2I . For each 1 ≤ k ≤ 2I, we can hence
enumerate the elements of some countably infinite subset ofXk in a sequence x0k, x
1
k, x
2
k, . . . , x
n
k , . . . (where
xnk 6= xn
′
k for any n, n
′ ∈ N with n 6= n′). We then define a sequence 〈Cnk 〉 of partitions of Xk by Cnk =
{{x1k}, . . . , {xnk}, Xk − {x1k, . . . , xnk}} for all n ∈ N+. We write X0k := Xk and Xnk := Xk − {x1k, . . . , xnk}
for all n ∈ N+. Note that x0k ∈ Xnk for all n ∈ N. Let C0 := {X1, . . . , X2I} and Cn := Cn1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cn2I for
all n ∈ N+. Let φ0 : C0 → C1 and ψ0 : C0 → C1 be defined by φ0(X0k) := X1k and ψ0(X0k) := {x1k} (for all
1 ≤ k ≤ 2I). For any n ∈ N+, let φn : Cn → Cn+1 and ψn : Cn → Cn+1 be defined by φn({xn′k }) := {xn
′
k }
and ψn({xn′k }) := {xn
′
k } for all 1 ≤ n′ ≤ n (n′ ∈ N+) and by φn(Xnk ) := Xn+1k and ψn(Xnk ) := {xn+1k }
(for all 1 ≤ k ≤ 2I). By the disagreement condition, there is some Ω–partition W = {W1, . . . ,WI} and
some pi ∈ pi(W) such that Wi is pi, Gi–one (for any 1 ≤ i ≤ I). Define f ∈ Φ as the act such that,
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ I and any ω ∈ Wi, f(ω) = x0i . Define g ∈ Φ as the act such that, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ I
and any ω ∈ Wi, g(ω) = x0I+i. For any n ∈ N, let Fn† ⊆ ΦW,Cn be the set of acts h such that for any
1 ≤ i ≤ I there exists some 1 ≤ k ≤ 2 · I and some 1 ≤ m ≤ n+ 1 such that h(ω) = xmk for all ω ∈ Wi.
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For any n ∈ N, since Fn† is unambiguous w.r.t. 〈W, Cn〉, there is exactly one act hn1 ∈ Fn† that has the
same 〈W, Cn〉–graining as f and there is exactly one act hn2 ∈ Fn† that has the same 〈W, Cn〉–graining
as g. Replacing h1, h2 with f, g, we define Fn := (Fn† − {hn1 , hn2}) ∪ {f, g} for any n ∈ N. Note that
Fn ⊆ ΦW,Cn+1 (n ∈ N). Moreover, Fn is unambiguous w.r.t. 〈W, Cn〉 and there is no set F ′ with
Fn ⊆ F ′ ⊆ ΦW,Cn that is unambiguous w.r.t. 〈W, Cn〉.
By Lemma A.2, there exist vij , w
i
j ∈
∏
i Zi with v
i
i = w
i
i and v
i
I+i = w
i
I+i (1 ≤ i ≤ I, 1 ≤
j ≤ 2I) such that for all Γ–partitions C with 2 · I different consequences Y1, . . . , Y2I ∈ C and for all
〈ui〉, 〈u′i〉 ∈ u(C)I with ui(Yj) = vij , and u′i(Yj) = wij (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2I), we have
[s(〈ui〉)]({Yl, Ym}) = {Yl} but [s(〈u′i〉)]({Yl, Ym}) = {Ym} (for all 1 ≤ l ≤ I and I + 1 ≤ m ≤ 2I).
We recursively define a sequence 〈un1 , . . . , unI 〉n∈N of vectors of individual utility functions such that,
for each n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ I, uni ∈ ui(Cn). For all even n ∈ N, let uni (Xnk ) := vik and, for all
odd n ∈ N, let uni (Xnk ) := wik (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I and all 1 ≤ k ≤ 2I). For any n, n′ ∈ N+ with
n′ ≤ n, let un+1i ({xn
′
k }) := uni ({xn
′
k }) and let un+1i ({xn+1k }) := uni (Xnk ) (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, and 1 ≤
k ≤ 2I). It follows from Lemma A.2 that, for all n ∈ N, (*) [s(〈u2ni 〉)]({X2nl , X2nm }) = {X2nl } and
[s(〈u2n+1i 〉)]({X2n+1l , X2n+1m }) = {X2n+1m } (for all 1 ≤ l ≤ I and I + 1 ≤ m ≤ 2I). Moreover, (**)
uni = u
n+1
i ◦ ψn for any n ∈ N and 1 ≤ i ≤ I. Since S has a wide domain, there is a sequence
〈Mn1 , . . . ,MnI 〉n∈N of vectors of individual decision–theoretic models in the domain of S such that, for
all n ∈ N and all 1 ≤ i ≤ I, W〈Mni 〉 = W, pMni = pi, C〈Mni 〉 = Cn, uMni = uni and F〈Mni 〉 = Fn. We
now show that 〈Mn+1i 〉 refines 〈Mni 〉 (for all n ∈ N). Conditions 1–4 of the definition of a refinement
(p. 19) are trivially satisfied. On the one hand, (**) yields for any h ∈ Fn with h 6= f, g and for any
n ∈ N: uni (Cn(h(ω))) = [un+1i ◦ ψn](Cn(h(ω))) = un+1i (Cn+1(h(ω))) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I and all ω ∈ Ω. On
the other hand, we have (for any n ∈ N) uni (Xni ) = vii = wii = un+1i (Xn+1i ) = [un+1i ◦ φn](Xni ) and,
hence, uni (Cn(f(ω))) = [un+1i ◦ φn](Cn(f(ω))) = un+1i (Cn+1(f(ω))) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I and all ω ∈ Wi.
Similarly for g. Since Wi is pi, Gi–one, Lemma A.1 yields Gi(pi, uni , h1, h2) = Gi(pi, u
n+1
i , h1, h2) for all
h1, h2 ∈ Fn, 1 ≤ i ≤ I, n ∈ N. Similarly for g. Hence, all conditions for a refinement are satisfied.
Finally, (*) implies, by Definition 3.1, CS(〈M2ni 〉)({f, g}) = {f} and CS(〈M2n+1i 〉)({f, g}) = {g} (for all
n ∈ N). In other words, f absolutely dominates g w.r.t. s(〈u2ni 〉) whereas g absolutely dominates f
w.r.t. s(〈u2n+1i 〉) (for all n ∈ N). 
References
[1] R. Zeckhauser A. Hylland. The impossibility of Bayesian group decision making
with separate aggregation of beliefs and values. Econometrica, 47:1321–1336, 1979.
[2] K. Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Values. Wiley, New York, 1951.
[3] J.L. Becker and R. Sarin. Gamble dependent utility. Management Science, 33:1367–
82, 1987.
[4] J. Broome. Bolker–Jeffrey expected utility theory and axiomatic utilitarianism.
Review of Economic Studies, 57:477–503, 1990.
[5] S.H. Chew. A generalization of the quasilinear mean with applications to the mea-
surement of income inequality and decision theory resolving the Allais paradox.
Econometrica, 51:1065–92, 1983.
[6] W. Edwards. The prediction of decisions among bets. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 50:201–214, 1955.
27
[7] Henley E.J. and Kumamoto H. Probabilistic Risk Assessment: Reliability Engineer-
ing, Design, and Analysis. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.,
Piscataway, 1992.
[8] P.C. Fishburn. Transitive measurable utility. Journal of Economic Theory, 31:293–
317, 1983.
[9] P.C. Fishburn. Nonlinear Preference and Utility Theory. Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, 1988.
[10] I. Gilboa. Expected utility with purely subjective non–additive probabilities. Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 16:65–88, 1987.
[11] T.S. Glickman and M. Gough, editors. Readings in Risk, Washington, D.C., 1990.
Resources for the Future.
[12] J.H. Goodman. Existence of Compromises in Simple Group Decisions. PhD thesis,
Department of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon University, 1988.
[13] A.C. Haddix, S.M. Teutsch, P.A. Shaffer, and D.O. Dunet, editors. Prevention
Effectiveness: A Guide to Decision Analysis and Economic Evaluation, Oxford,
1996. OUP.
[14] P. Hammond. Ex–ante and ex–post welfare optimality under uncertainty. Econom-
ica, 48:235–250, 1981.
[15] M. Hild. The instability of robust aggregation. California Institute of Technology,
Social Science Working Paper, 1113, 2001b. Available at www.hild.org.
[16] M. Hild. The instability of ex post and robust aggregation without state–consequence
separation. California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper, 1114,
2001c. Available at www.hild.org.
[17] M. Hild. Policy reversals in risk management: The effect of refined analyses. Califor-
nia Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper, 1116, 2001d. Available
at www.hild.org.
[18] M. Hild, R.C. Jeffrey, and M. Risse. Preference aggregation after Harsanyi. In
M. Salles and J. Weymark, editors, Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism.
CUP, Cambridge, 2001.
[19] D. Kahneman and A. Tversky. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica, 47:263–91, 1979.
[20] U.S. Karmarkar. Subjectively weighted utility: A descriptive extension of the ex-
pected utility model. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 21:61–72,
1978.
[21] J.-F. Laslier. Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives. Social
Choice and Welfare, 17:269–282, 2000.
28
[22] S. Leeds. Levi’s decision theory. Philosophy of Science, 57:158–168, 1990.
[23] I. Levi. Hard Choices. CUP, Cambridge, 1986.
[24] I. Levi. Pareto unanimity and consensus. Journal of Philosophy, 87:481–492, 1990.
[25] G. Loomes and R. Sugden. Regret theory: An alternative theory of rational choice
under uncertainty. The Economic Journal, 92:805–824, 1982.
[26] M.J. Machina. “Expected utility” analysis without the independence axiom. Econo-
metrica, 50:277–323, 1982b.
[27] P. Mongin. Consistent Bayesian aggregation. Journal of Economic Theory, 66:313–
351, 1995.
[28] P. Mongin. The paradox of the Bayesian experts and state–dependent utility theory.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 29:331–361, 1998.
[29] C. Plott. Axiomatic social choice theory: An overview and interpretation. American
Journal of Political Science, 20:511–596, 1976.
[30] J. Quiggin. A theory of anticipated utility. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 3:323–43, 1982.
[31] L.J. Savage. The Foundations of Statistics. Dover, New York, 1954.
[32] M.J. Schervish, T. Seidenfeld, and J.B. Kadane. State–dependent utilities. JASA,
85:840–847, 1990.
[33] M.J. Schervish, T. Seidenfeld, and J.B. Kadane. Shared preferences and state–
dependent utilities. Management Science, 37:1575–1589, 1991.
[34] D. Schmeidler. Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity.
Econometrica, 57:571–587, 1989.
[35] T. Seidenfeld. Outline of a theory of partially ordered preferences. Philosophical
Topics, 21:173–189, 1993.
[36] T. Seidenfeld, J.B. Kadane, and M.J. Schervish. On the shared preferences of two
Bayesian decision makers. Journal of Philosophy, 86:225–244, 1989.
[37] A. Sen. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Holden–Day, San Fransisco, 1970.
[38] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Reactor Safety Study : An Assessment of Ac-
cident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants. Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, Washington, D.C., 1975.
29
